macOS 27 on a CUI Mac Fleet: Upgrade, Hold, or Document the Gap
Where each macOS stands at CMVP
NIST's Cryptographic Module Validation Program names Apple's modules by corecrypto generation, not by macOS marketing name. Both in-process lists below were read on 10 November 2026, the day CMVP last updated them.
| macOS | Module generation at CMVP | Status on Apple silicon |
|---|---|---|
| 15 Sequoia | corecrypto 18.3 | Validated: User #5184, Kernel #5387, Secure Key Store #5305 (certificate pages read 4 November 2026, all Active) |
| 26 Tahoe | OS 26 | In process, no certificate. User and Kernel at Comment Resolution with the lab (26 October 2026); Secure Key Store at Review |
| 27 | OS 27 | Implementation Under Test only (entries dated 16 and 23 October 2026). No certificate |
Apple released macOS 27 on 14 September 2026. The shipping macOS therefore sits two module generations past the newest validated set. We do not assert that CMVP's "OS 27" label maps to the macOS 27 release; that is Apple's naming and the reasonable reading, not a statement CMVP makes.
What the rule attaches to that gap
NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 requirement 3.13.11 calls for FIPS-validated cryptography when it is used to protect the confidentiality of CUI. The CMMC scoring text at 32 CFR 170.24 puts a number on it: if encryption is employed but is not FIPS-validated, three points are subtracted; if encryption is not employed, five.
32 CFR 170.21(a)(2)(ii) then makes one exception to its one-point limit on POA&M items: SC.L2-3.13.11 "may be included on a POA&M if encryption is employed but it is not FIPS-validated". A POA&M has to be closed out within 180 days of the Conditional CMMC Status Date under 170.21(b). You cannot close it by waiting for a validation queue you do not control.
The "temporary deficiency" question
32 CFR 170.4 defines a temporary deficiency as a condition where remediation "is feasible, and a known fix is available or is in process", documented in an operational plan of action. The definition gives an example close to this situation: FIPS-validated cryptography that requires a patch, where the patched version is no longer the validated version, "may be a temporary deficiency".
Our reading, labelled as inference: that example describes a patch to a module you had already implemented as validated. Choosing to move a fleet to a new major release whose module has never been validated is a different fact pattern, and the word in the rule is "may". Do not plan on an assessor extending the example to a voluntary upgrade. If you intend to argue it, write the argument before the assessment, not during it.
Three options, with what each costs
| Option | FIPS position | What it costs |
|---|---|---|
| Hold CUI Macs on macOS 15 | Validated modules | You must keep Sequoia patched and confirm Apple is still shipping security updates for it. Flaw remediation (SI.L2-3.14.1) does not pause while you wait. New hardware may not run it |
| Move to macOS 26 | In process, no certificate | 3.13.11 is not met as written until certificates issue. Furthest along in the queue of the two newer releases |
| Move to macOS 27 | Implementation Under Test only | 3.13.11 is not met as written, with no way to estimate when it will be. Current Apple security content |
None of these is free, and this page does not tell you which to pick. An unpatched validated OS and a patched unvalidated OS each fail a different requirement. What an assessor can fairly expect is that you chose knowingly.
How to keep the choice from being made for you
- Control major upgrades through MDM. If users can upgrade on release day, your FIPS position is being decided by a notification. Apple's management framework lets an MDM defer major updates for a limited period; confirm the current limit and behaviour in your own MDM before you rely on it.
- Baseline the version you actually run. The macOS Security Compliance Project's current release, mSCP 2.0 release 27.1 of 22 October 2026, supports macOS 27, and earlier guidance covers Tahoe and Sequoia. See mSCP vs CIS vs STIG.
- Split the fleet if it helps. Macs that never handle CUI are not carrying a 3.13.11 confidentiality claim and can move sooner. That only works if your asset categories are real; see Mac asset classification.
What to write down
- For each macOS version in scope: the module name exactly as CMVP lists it, the certificate number or the in-process status, and the date you checked.
- The decision, who made it, and the date. One paragraph is enough.
- If any CUI Mac runs a release without certificates: the score effect, the plan of action entry, and the event that closes it.
- A re-check interval. Certificate status is perishable; a monthly look at the two CMVP in-process lists costs minutes.
The mechanics of reading a certificate against FileVault are in FIPS-validated encryption for CUI, and the POA&M rules are in what you can defer and what you cannot.
Sources: CMVP Modules In Process list and Implementation Under Test list, both read 10 November 2026; CMVP certificate pages read 4 November 2026; Apple's security content page for macOS 27, read 4 November 2026; the mSCP releases page, read 10 November 2026; 32 CFR 170.4, 170.21 and 170.24 on eCFR, read 10 November 2026. Intel Macs are not covered here. Statements marked as inference are ours. Educational material, not legal advice.